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ABSTRACT 
The sub-optimal performance of state-owned refineries in Nigeria has led to a significant gap 
in the supply of refined petroleum products (RPPs) in the country. More so, the growing 
demand for these products has further widened the gap to the range of 500,000 – 600,000 
barrels per day (bpd). Consequently, most of the imports for RPPs in Nigeria are being filled 
from the United States and North-Western Europe at the expense of the Nigerian economy. 
However, given the abundance of petroleum resources in Nigeria and its long history in the 
production of oil, it is unfortunate that the local refineries are hardly maintained to meet the 
needs of the local population. In addition, the inability of the Nigerian state to build additional 
refining capacity to cushion its domestic supply gap for RPPs has become a major concern. 
With more than 40 licenses issued to private companies since 2002, only two companies (Niger 
Delta Petroleum Resources Refinery and Dangote Oil Refinery) have made noticeable progress 
in new refinery construction. This paper is focused on investigating the current challenges of 
refinery construction in Nigeria. This is done with a view of comparing the drivers and enablers 
of productivity in construction in this sector during the period of 1965 – 1989 and how they 
differ from the current period of 2000 - 2019 in Nigeria. A systematic literature review within 
the academic journals, source documents from the industry, relevant interviews from published 
news media and consulting organisations were used to identify and categorise these 
challenges. The findings of this study were validated by interviews from experts across key 
industries in this sector. The study reveals that change of ownership structures from the 
government sector to the private sector between the two eras, present additional challenges. 
These challenges cut across availability of capital, inconsistent government priorities and 
access to land for construction. Others include cronyism and corruption, weak political will, 
unstructured refinery licensing scheme, security challenges and economic factors regarding 
the regulated downstream market in Nigeria. Key recommendations proffered to help solve 
these problems include a private sector-led  partnership with the government in the form of 
public private partnerships (PPPs), a review of existing methods for licensing refineries for 
private organisations, the development of local manpower with relevant technical skills to help 
lower the cost of expatriate labour and the establishment of more designated clusters as free 
trade zones within the oil-producing Niger Delta. These recommendations will help lower the 
entry barriers for private organisations in this sector. 
KEYWORDS: Construction, Government Licensing, Performance, Private Refinery, Nigeria 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, the performance of state-owned refineries in Nigeria has been sub-
optimal, giving rise to significant imports of refined petroleum products (RPPs) into the 
country (PWC, 2017; Sa'ad & Isah, 2016; Wapner, 2017). Sadly, this development has 
continued to pose serious challenges to the Nigerian economy as evidenced by the frequent 
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shortages in the supply of petroleum products (Abila, 2015; Mbunwe, 2014; Odularu, 2008; 
Sanni, 2014). There are four state-owned refineries with a combined capacity of 445,000 
barrels per day (bpd) in Nigeria. This capacity is enough to support at least 70 percent of the 
country’s 630,000 to 700,000 bpd domestic need for refined petroleum products (RPPs). 
Unfortunately, Nigeria still imports more than 80 percent of its refined oil from North Western 
Europe and the United States (PWC, 2017; Siddig, 2014). The imported products mainly 
include petrol (PMS), diesel (AGO), and kerosene (DPK). Researchers opine that this 
development is hardly expected from a country that has been the largest exporter of crude oil 
in Africa for many years and has at various times occupied between the 6th and 8th positions 
amongst the world’s largest producers of crude oil (Akpan, 2009; Kadafa et al., 2012). The aim 
of this paper is to investigate the inability of Nigeria to build additional refining capacity and 
fully maintain its existing refineries for more than two decades despite incentives. 
Since 2002, shortly after Nigeria’s transition to democracy, more than 40 licenses have been 
issued by the government through the Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR). This was 
to encourage the participation of indigenous private companies in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector 
in order to achieve a more sustainable growth (DPR, 2017). However, the repetitive failures of 
intending companies bidding to enter the refining sector on a private platform calls for concerns 
(Angela et al., 2019; DPR, 2017; Nkaginieme, 2005). 
According to Industry analysts, PwC (2017), the productivity and performance of Nigeria’s 
refining sector can be improved considerably through policies geared towards the construction 
of scalable or modular refineries as well as the effective refurbishment of existing ones. After 
the construction of Nigeria’s premier oil refinery in 1965 by a consortium of Shell-BP, the 
government took up the challenge to build more refineries when it became clear the first 
refinery was inadequate to cater for the country’s growing domestic fuel demands (Turner, 
1977). Hence, within eleven years from 1978 to 1989, three refineries with capacities ranging 
from 100,000 - 150,000 barrels per day (bpd) were completed (Turner, 1977 and Wapner, 
2017). Unfortunately, the current trend of increasing demand for RPPs which far outstrips local 
supply has failed to produce a similar drive for refinery construction to that of the 1970s and 
1980s. 
It is, therefore, necessary to understand what has changed over the years in the petrochemical 
construction industry in Nigeria. With all the opportunities for RPPs present in the Nigerian 
market, it would be rational to ask why it has been difficult to build additional refining capacity 
for the past 20 years. Similarly, it would be reasonable to uncover the drivers for the success 
of construction in this sector in the period 1965 – 1989 and understand what has changed since 
then.  
It is these questions that this study seeks to answer as well as provide insights on how the 
challenges can be overcome in order to enhance productivity in the sector. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The discovery and subsequent export of crude oil from Nigeria launched the country amongst 
the world’s oil-producing countries and essentially changed the dynamics of the country’s 
economic situation (Badejo & Nwilo, 2004). However, reaping the benefits of the petrodollar 
has not brought much expected gains to the economic situation of Nigeria. Ross (2013) and Eti 
et al. (2004) observed that Nigeria has failed to fully maximise its revenue from petroleum 
resources to address poverty and unemployment amongst its citizens. 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT Volume 10 Number 1 2020 
 
Iheukwumere, O. E., Moore, D. and Omotayo, T.  (2020). Investigating the challenges of refinery construction in 
Nigeria: A snapshot across two-time frames over the past 55 years. International Journal of Construction Supply 
Chain Management, Vol. 10, No. 1 (pp. 46-72). DOI: 10.14424/ijcscm100120-46-72 
48 
 
Clearly, as huge quantities of crude oil are exported from Nigeria and refined petroleum 
products (RPPs) imported back into the country, Nigeria is in effect short-changed in this sort 
of economic transaction. While some countries in the Middle East and South America such as 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil (or even Venezuela) equally endowed with abundant 
petroleum resources, have historically made important gains from the refining of their 
petroleum resources; Nigeria still grapples with the imbalances of its foreign-fuel-dominated 
economy (Bacon & Kojima, 2006; Crystal, 2016; O'Rourke & Connoly, 2003). The result of 
this is the chronic erosion of its capital budget in the form of fuel subsidies, loss in employment 
opportunities, missed opportunities for overseas investments and broader economic gains 
(Balouga, 2012). 
Nigeria has four state-owned refineries operated by its national oil company – Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). These refineries have a total installed capacity of 
445,000 barrels per day (BPD) and are strategically located across the country with various 
installed capacities as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Nigerian refineries with their capacities, locations and year of commissioning (NNPC, 2018) 
 
The first Port Harcourt refinery, built in 1965 was constructed by a consortium of International 
Oil Companies (IOCs) - Shell-BP (Turner, 1977). It was taken over by the government in 1973 
in a bid to gain complete control of its downstream sector (New York Times, 1979 and Wapner, 
2017). Subsequently, the government embarked on a series of refinery construction projects 
engaging different international contractors in order to respond to growing domestic fuel needs. 
Hence, from 1978 to 1989, three new refineries were completed for the Federal Government 
as project owners (Ogbuigwe, 2018; Wapner, 2017). Since the completion of these projects, 
the country has only enjoyed a brief period of self-sufficiency and exports of RPPs (Atumah, 
2016; Ogbuigwe, 2018). Despite generating more than 90% of its foreign exchange earnings 
from crude oil, the supply of refined petroleum to the Nigerian market has been a major struggle 
for more than two decades (Watts, 2004; Wapner 2017). 
Expectedly, this development has received much attention over the years from different 
government administrations in Nigeria, although without a lasting solution. It is, therefore, 
necessary to review what the government has done towards mitigating this problem. 
 
 
Refinery Name Location Capacity 
(Bpsd) 
Year of 
Commission 
Port Harcourt Refining Company I 
(PHRC I) 
Rivers State 60,000 1965 
Warri Refining and Petrochemical 
Company (WRPC) 
Delta State 125,000 1978 
Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical 
Company (KRPC) 
Kaduna State 110,000 1980 
Port Harcourt Refining Company II 
(PHRC II) 
Rivers State 150,000 1989 
Total  445,000  
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Previous Government Efforts to Address Nigeria’s Refining Problems  
Nigeria’s transition to democracy in 1999 witnessed the introduction of certain regulatory 
changes to help reposition the oil and gas industry for a more sustainable growth. This was a 
move to encourage local participation in the downstream sector in order to create more 
prosperity via local content development (Ross, 2013). 
Some researchers (Balouga, 2012; Eme & Onwuka, 2011; Nkaginieme, 2005; Ogbuigwe, 
2018) have articulated certain measures previously undertaken by the government to achieve 
these objectives. There is evidence from these studies that government policy over the years 
towards addressing the petroleum supply gap in Nigeria has taken a multilayer approach. 
Commencing with the partial deregulation of the downstream petroleum sector in the first term 
of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s democratic administration (1999 - 2003), the government 
strategy further incorporated policies that would be implemented over time, some by other 
administrations. These policies were mainly: the issuance of licenses or permits for the 
construction of private refineries, the award of contracts for the refurbishment and maintenance 
of government refineries, the attempted sale of the government refineries to private companies, 
and the withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy on imported RPPs for domestic consumption. 
Figure 1 shows the timeline of these initiatives. 
Although the first two initiatives were introduced, they have been mostly unsuccessful given 
the inability of almost all the refinery license holders (except Niger Delta Petroleum Resources 
and Dangote Oil Refinery) to complete their projects. This is a failure which calls for serious 
review of the licensing process about the difficulties experienced by the private sector. 
Licensing for private refineries  
Nigeria’s Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is mandated with the authority to issue 
licenses or permits to private investors for the establishment of hydrocarbon processing plants 
(DPR, 2017). The agency mainly commenced the issuance of these licenses around 2002 
without any structured guidelines at the time (Nkaginieme, 2005). However, in 2007, the 
agency reviewed its policies and made some changes producing an updated guide for the award 
of licenses. In its current form, DPR (2017) provides three tiers of licensing for private 
refineries and they include:  
License to Establish (LTE) 
This is the first stage of the licensing ladder and carries a validity of 2 years. It involves the 
investor presenting a conclusive feasibility study of the project site including marketing plans, 
Attempted 
removal of 
petroleum 
subsidy
Attempted sale or 
divestment of the 
refinerses to 
private companies
Award of 
contracts for the 
refurbishment of 
refineries
Commencement 
of issuance of 
licenses for 
refinery 
construction
2002 2003 2007 2011 
Figure 1: Timeline for Nigeria’s downstream sector interventions.  
Source: Synthesised from DPR (2017) and Nkaginieme (2005) 
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product specifications, health and safety standards, infrastructural support plans and proposed 
crude oil (feedstock) supply plans. The LTE application carries a statutory fee of US $50,000 
as well as a service charge of 500,000 Nigerian Naira (about US $1,400). Putting aside the 
issue of the fees, the requirements seem quite reasonable except that for feedstock 
arrangements and that of infrastructure support. Clearly the decision to let investors arrange 
their own feedstock supply in Nigeria can present some difficulties for the companies. This is 
because of potential complications that could arise from interfering with existing agreements 
tying oil producing companies to Joint Ventures (JVs) and Production Sharing Contracts 
(PSCs) with other parties (Elmaci, 2019). The Nigerian government cannot abdicate this 
responsibility to private companies alone and must rise to the challenge by making guarantees 
for the availability of feedstock supplies. One way of doing this could be by demanding that a 
certain proportion of crude oil produced must be locally refined. In this way, government can 
partner with producers and refiners to set up special purpose vehicles (SPVs) in which profits 
can be shared by the partners. Such arrranrgements must be fair and robust. An alternate 
practice similar to this has been adopted by China, a crude oil importing nation, as it now 
guarantees its private refiners certain quotas for crude oil imports (Downs, 2017). 
The requirement for infrastructural support plans could also present additional challenges. It is 
worth noting that there is an absence of good road networks to most of the suitable site 
locations. Hence, these companies are required to build their own high-grade roads to support 
the movement of heavy equipment and machinery to and from the project sites. This is an 
additional financial burden on these companies, which further raises the entry barrier in this 
industry (Nkaginieme, 2005; Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The development of designated 
clusters near seaports with good roads and jetties as free trade zones could help reduce this 
burden for new entrants. The location of Dangote refinery near the Lagos seaport provides such 
benefits. However, this will be elusive to other refinery sites located further down the Niger 
Delta, where the seaports are barely functional. Therefore, more of such infrastructure should 
be made available in the Niger Delta as well. The second stage of the licensing ladder is the 
approval to construct (ATC). 
Approval to Construct (ATC) 
In this stage, the investor is required to submit a detailed engineering plan of the plant, to be 
reviewed by DPR’s engineering team and approved upon satisfaction of certain provisions of 
their technical guidelines. This stage also carries a validity of two years, within which the 
investor is required to complete at least 50% of the mechanical erection of the plant as provided 
in the submitted engineering design plan. The failure to attain this level of completion would 
necessitate the revalidation of the licence fees. However, it is not clear from the published 
guidelines if the ATC licensing stage requires additional payment or is attained upon satisfying 
the requirements of the LTE stage. Also, it is not clear how long a company can remain in the 
ATC stage as the provision only states that revalidated ATCs cannot be renewed. What support 
can an organisation receive, which invested much but ran into circumstances outside their 
control, for any delay to their project beyond the approved date? A detailed clarification of this 
provision, including how long a revalidated ATC should last, needs to be communicated 
clearly. DPR also needs to have a strategy for supporting the more progressive companies to 
reach the final licensing stage and eventually kick-start their operations. Tanaka (2014) 
chronicles several accounts of state support to mega project development in the oil and gas 
industry, particularly by Russia, China and France. The use of import waivers for critical 
equipment can be helpful at this construction stage for the companies. The last stage of the 
licensing is the license to operate (LTO). 
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License to Operate (LTO)  
This is the final stage in the licensing ladder and requires the completion of the refinery plant 
manned by well-trained staff and the provision of necessary documentation, including 
operating manuals. This stage clearly carries a statutory payment of US $100,000 and another 
service charge of 500,000 Nigerian Naira (about US $1,400). After this stage, the DPR begins 
to monitor the compliance of the refinery to certain standards, including its periodic 
maintenance programmes. These standards seem quite robust and compares well to that of 
some of the developed economies and would work if DPR effectively administers it without 
compromise (EPA, 2018; Gary et al., 2007). Figure 2 (below) shows refinery licensing 
progression through the three stages, their relative difficulties as well as the number of 
companies on each stage (DPR 2017). 
 
 
The details of these licenses are provided in Table 2. It is also worth mentioning that there is 
another kind of license known as approval to relocate (ATR). This is created specifically for 
plants which may be located outside the country or within the country but whose owners intend 
to relocate to Nigeria or to another part of Nigeria to continue its operations. A typical example 
of this license is that of the planned relocation of the 100,000 bpd previously BP-owned African 
Refinery Port Harcourt Limited (ARPHL) from Turkey to Port Harcourt, Nigeria. This plant is 
planned to be collocated with the Port Harcourt refineries upon transfer (Egbejule, 2019). 
Table 2:  Status of licensed refineries by DPR (DPR, 2017) 
Licensing Stage Number of 
Refineries 
Refinery Type Status 
License to Establish 
(LTEs) 
29 22 Modular, 6 conversions 
and 1 conventional 
17 expired and 12 active 
licenses 
Approval to 
Construct (ATCs) 
10 10 modular units 7 active and 3 xpired 
licenses 
License to Operate 
(LTOs) 
1 1 modular unit 1 active license 
 
 
 
License to 
Establish 
(LTE)
Approval to 
Construct 
(ATC)
License to 
operate (LTO)
1 LTO 
10 ATCs 
29 LTEs 
Figure 2: The licensing hierarchy and difficulty levels (Source: adapted from DPR, 2017) 
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Conventional and Modular Refineries  
A conventional refinery is a standard refinery facility built to fully process variable crude slate 
into several different product yields. These types of refineries are usually built onsite and takes 
substantial resources and time (usually from 3 years) to be completed (Gary et al., 2007 and 
Cross et al., 2013). They also have higher profit margins as they can process multiple range of 
products. Conventional refineries usually have high capacities in the range of 100,000 to more 
than 1 million bpd and tend to take longer time to break even as their development costs usually 
run into billions of dollars (PWC, 2017). 
On the other hand, a modular refinery is a crude oil processing plant that has been constructed 
entirely on skid mounted structures. Each structure contains a portion of the entire process 
plant, and through interstitial piping the components link together to form an easily manageable 
process (Cenam Energy, 2012). They normally provide a quick fix solution to economies that 
have a need to adapt rapidly to local demand. This is because they can be built offsite in 
modules and transported to the site where they can be assembled. The speed and ease of their 
construction, including their relatively lower capital cost requirements are their key advantages. 
A typical 20,000 - 30,000 bpd modular refinery may cost between $180 – 250 Million and may 
take between 12 - 18 months to build (PWC, 2017).  
Refinery Refurbishment Programmes 
On the effectiveness of the refurbishment of existing refineries, Figures 3 and 4 show the 
capacity utilisation of the refineries for a period of eighteen years from 2001 to 2018 and a 
comparison of Nigeria’s refineries’ utilisation rates with that from similar economies in Africa 
(top 3 African economies). 
This figure shows a fluctuating performance and gradual decline of the refineries’ production 
rates to below 30%. This does not compare well with the performance of refineries from other 
countries with a similar economy to Nigeria, which have maintained the performance of their 
refineries up to, at least, 65% between the years 2013 – 2018. Clearly, the steady decline in 
performance of NNPC refineries demonstrates the ineffectiveness of any maintenance 
programmes in the last two decades. 
 
Figure 3: Capacity Utilisation of NNPC refineries (2001 - 2018).  
Source: Adapted from NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2001 – 2018 
-10.00
0.00
10.00
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Figure 4 highlights how ineffective Nigeria’s refinery asset management system has been 
compared to its similar economies in Africa. 
However, as at the time of this write up, all the refineries have been inoperative for more than 
a year due to ongoing assessment for a major turnaround maintenance. In addition, there has 
been discussions between the Nigerian government and some foreign technical partners such 
as Saipem, General Electric, Eni and commodity traders such as Vitol and Trafigura on special 
arrangements to refurbish and operate the refineries. Meanwhile, no developments have 
resulted from these discussions yet (Reuters, 2018). 
 
Figure 4: Refinery capacity utilisation of top African economies 
Source: Adapted from OPEC annual statistical bulletin 2017 
The need for public private partnership (PPP) 
Public Private Partnership (PPP) has been suggested by experts and scholars as a viable means 
of building Nigeria’s infrastructure, including the downstream assets such as refineries (PWC, 
2017; Unya, 2015). PPPs are partnership arrangements between a public sector entity and a 
private sector entity, which are created for the development and management of public 
infrastructure or assets for a specified period based on agreed commercial terms (Vining et al., 
2008; Yescombe, 2011). Essentially, PPPs represent a form of shared service delivery between 
the public and private sector in which the private sector supports a public sector project through 
financing, construction or management of the asset in return for a stream of income from the 
government or indirectly from the users (Boardman et al., 2005; Vining et al., 2008). 
Although there has been concerns over sustainable use of PPPs in Nigeria mainly due to a lack 
of trust for government’s contribution and possible expropriation by future administrations 
(Akanfe et al., 2014; PWC, 2017). However, studies have shown that PPPs when carefully 
designed can yield better economic growth by helping Nigeria develop its critical 
infrastructure, including the refineries (Akanfe et al., 2014).  
METHOD 
This paper adopted a systematic literature review to investigate the difficulties of refinery 
construction in Nigeria across two different time horizons: 1965 – 1989 and 1999 – 2019. 
According to Grant and Booth (2009), a systematic literature review seeks to systematically 
search, appraise and synthesize research evidence into a conclusive whole. For this study, 
relevant publications covering academic journals, books, conference papers, government 
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publications, and consultancy papers were used to compare the productivity drivers and 
challenges in building Nigeria’s refinery infrastructure across the two time-horizons. 
In their study of government-owned refineries in Nigeria, Badmus et al. (2012) and Jesuleye 
et al. (2007), observed that there is a scarcity of journals within the academic literature 
precisely dealing with the overall assessment of Nigeria’s refineries. Also, more recent studies 
on Nigeria’s refinery problems deal mostly with issues of policy and economics rather than 
that of construction and infrastructure challenges (Ogbuigwe, 2018). While this study is 
focused on construction drivers and impediments for the refining industry in Nigeria, very few 
articles were found to focus precisely on this topic (Nkaginieme, 2005). Instead, most research 
in this sector tend to focus on specialised fields or disciplines ranging from Engineering (Eti, 
Ogaji & Probert, 2004; Jesuleye et al., 2007; Mbunwe, 2014), Economics (Musa, Hounsou & 
Adeyele, 2014), Business Administration (Sanni, 2014), Management, Social and Political 
Sciences (Baghebo & Beauty, 2015; Iwayemi, 2008; Ngwu, 2014; Wapner, 2017). Although 
these studies focused on specialised areas, a few were relevant to this study as they discussed 
some of the key underlying issues. 
To this effect, literature for this study was searched across databases such as Elsevier, 
SpringerLink, OnePetrol and Google Scholar; all of which have a good reputation of quality 
publications across disciplines that cover construction projects as well as those for the oil and 
gas sector. Keywords used for the search includes refinery construction, Nigeria’s refineries, 
licensing refineries, private refineries, performance of refineries, and government refineries; 
used in various combinations.  
Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
A total of 320 articles were produced from the initial search across the databases. However, 
this included a wide range of unrelated topics, including biorefineries, sustainable energy, flare 
gas refineries, gas-to-liquids technology, petrochemical supply chain, oil subsidy reforms and 
cybersecurity of petrochemical attacks in Nigeria. When all the non-related items, including 
duplications across the platforms, were filtered out, only 11 academic journals were identified 
with reference to the initial keywords. It is important to state that the exclusion criteria were 
based on relevance of the papers to the context of the study after checking the abstracts, 
introductions, and conclusions of the articles for relevance to the topic. Some fee articles were 
also dropped as their full copies could not be accessed. 
Then the list was expanded using a single-step forward and reverse snowballing approach to 
look at some of the references within the 11 articles, including suggested contemporary issues, 
which focused more on factors limiting refinery construction in Nigeria. This is because a 
snowballing approach can be useful for obtaining more research samples where data or 
participants can be hard to reach and makes it easier for studies to take place where they 
otherwise would have been impossible due to a lack of sufficient data (Sadler et al., 2010). 
Following this approach, additional 8 articles were identified comprising policy documents, 
government records, consultancy reports and excerpts of interviews from national dailies 
pertaining to developments and challenges of Nigeria’s refining assets. Consultancy papers 
from organisations such as PwC that hold substantial information on Nigeria’s oil and gas 
development were particularly useful due to the quality of data they possess as a result of their 
years of experience in Nigeria. 
These materials provided relevant information for the research topic. A total of 19 articles were 
finally reviewed. Among the materials selected, the oldest publication dates to 1977 and 
provided a rich and foundational basis for this study. Figure 5 shows the schematic of the 
research process employed for this study. 
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Figure 5: Literature search process 
After carefully reviewing the selected literature, some data were extracted from the 
publications, which include the author(s) and year of publication, research title, summaries of 
major findings, research method adopted and publication sources. The summaries of these 
finding are presented in Table 3. 
 
Figure 6: Types of articles considered 
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Figure 7: A chart showing the number of articles selected and their year of publications 
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From Table 3 (on page 67), an excel spreadsheet was used to conduct a simple descriptive 
analysis of the selected publications used for the study. It can be observed that journal articles 
constituted most of the selected sources with 11 articles as shown in Figure 6.  
Similarly, it can be observed from Figure 7 that most of the publications were dated from 2015 
to 2019. 
The study identifies nine categories of factors from the findings of Table 3. These factors have 
been categorised as shown in Table 4 (on page 71) as a comparison for developments across 
the two eras regarding the construction of Nigeria’s refinery infrastructure. 
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS 
From the Table 4, there were nine main categories of factors, which can be deduced from the 
findings of the selected literature. These can be summarily disused as follow: 
Project Ownership 
Nigeria’s transition to democracy from 1999 brought about the introduction of certain policy 
directions to devolve the downstream petroleum sector for a more sustainable growth 
(Nkaginieme, 2005; Ross, 2013). As such, there was a shift in focus in the ownership structure 
of oil and gas infrastructure mostly from government to private sector. This development led 
to a more structured approach for the issuance of permits and licenses to private investors for 
refinery construction. Hence, rather than build more refineries by itself, the government 
decided to allow the private sector to drive the initiative, while it regulates and monitors the 
activities. (DPR, 2017; Ogbuigwe, 2018). 
This change of ownership structure also brought some associated challenges with it, especially 
with the manner resources are accessed for such projects. 
Availability of capital and inconsistent government priorities. 
The injection of petrodollar from the oil windfall of the 1970s coupled with the boom for oil 
and gas infrastructure development at the time, fuelled developments of built assets and 
facilities in the industry (Strassmann, 1989). Although the current period (1999 – 2019) has 
equally enjoyed some important gains from oil, especially in the period of 2007 to 2014; 
however, government attention has focused less on oil infrastructure developments compared 
to public capital projects. Also, the prolonged delay with the passage of the Petroleum Industry 
Bill (PIB), including the uncertainties surrounding its implementation have deterred investors 
from such undertakings (Gary et al., 2007;  Osunmuyiwa & Kalfagianni, 2017; Ogbuigwe, 
2018; Speight 2010). In addition, the long regulated downstream market for RPPs has made 
development projects in the sector economically unviable (Nwachukwu, 2015). 
Access to land for construction 
With government as project sponsors in the 1970s, project financing was much easier buoyed 
by the influx of petrodollar from the oil windfall of the 1970s (Cole, et al. 2015; Osunmuyiwa 
and Kalfagianni, 2017). Land capital was also much easier for the government to obtain given 
the promulgation of Land Use Act in 1978, which allowed the federal government unrestricted 
access to large parcels of land without due compensation to the community stakeholders (Ako 
2009; Pedersen & Kweka, 2017). Conversely, the process of land acquisition in the current era 
for the private sector requires more participation of community stakeholders, hence more 
challenging for the organisations (Pedersen & Kweka, 2017). This places a certain financial 
burden not necessarily experienced by the government in the previous era (DPR, 2017; 
Nkaginieme, 2005).  
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Cronyism and corruption  
During the previous era of 1965 – 1989, the issue of cronyism and corruption, especially 
regarding the diversion of RPPs to neighbouring countries were near absent. Presently, there is 
a highly connected import cartel who benefit from import subsidy payments and thereby 
frustrate govt. policies towards refinery establishment (Chikwem, 2014). The government itself 
has either shown incompetence or little regard to punish the culprits and stem the tide of 
corruption in this sector (Boyo, 2015; Chikwem, 2014/2016; Nkaginieme, 2005; Ogbuigwe, 
2018).  
Political will 
The high political will of the previous era was buoyed by government’s desire to build and own 
its own refining infrastructure as this was considered signs of development (Turner, 1977). 
Unfortunately, in the current era, government has displayed moderate to low political will 
towards this issue compared to the previous era. This is because government communicates 
willingness to get the sector working but does little to turn around the situation (Chikwem, 
2016; Eti et al, 2003; Nwachukwu, 2015, Ogbuigwe, 2018; Wapner, 2017)  
Licensing scheme 
The Petroleum Act of 1969 drafted by the federal government provided the guidance for the 
establishment of hydrocarbon processing plants in the previous era. As such, it was much easier 
for the government to operate by their own agreement. Current licensing scheme by the DPR 
designed for the private sector has proved ineffectual and have been considered by private 
investors to contain requirements presenting high entry/exit barriers (Nkaginieme 2005; 
Nwachukwu, 2015). 
Security Issues 
Oil and gas infrastructure in Nigeria were hardly the target of any violent attacks in the previous 
era except for the brief period of Nigeria’s civil war from 1967 to 1970 (Turner, 1977). As 
such, the previous era witnessed none of the challenges of the current period, whereby 
hostilities in the Niger Delta has mainly targeted oil and gas infrastructure (Ogbuigwe, 2018; 
Wapner, 2017). Particularly hit are the oil pipelines conveying crude oil to and from oil 
terminals, flow stations and refineries. The preponderance of such occurrences deters investors 
from embarking on multimillion-dollar infrastructure projects in Nigeria such as refineries. 
This incidence also increases the operational costs of doing business in Nigeria. Such is 
reflected in the form of additional cost for the procurement of security for the built assets and 
personnel as well as repairs and replacement of damaged equipment. Hence, making such 
projects even costlier than importing refined oil. 
Economic factors and regulated downstream market 
Given that the construction of refineries requires the importation of specialised equipment and 
expatriate labour, the constantly fluctuating Nigerian currency makes access for foreign 
exchange more difficult (Ogbuigwe, 2018). In addition, the regulated downstream market 
makes it impossible for private organisations to profit from any investment in the Nigerian 
environment (Wapner, 2017). This contrasts with the practice, whereby the government 
absorbs the shortfall in selling RPPs to the public by paying subsidies on the products. This 
condition cannot be applied to the private sector which needs a free market to thrive based on 
profits. 
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The articles for this study were sourced by a single researcher but the process was supervised 
by two independent senior researchers. Hence, the potential for omission of some important 
articles remain. A further limitation arises from the use of only materials available via online 
sources. The exclusion of fee articles, which cannot be fully accessed as well as the reliance on 
some non-academic materials such as consultancy papers and government publications, which 
contain relevant information not available in academic journals may place a limit on academic 
quality of publications used. This may be explained by the fact that the studies focusing on 
refinery construction challenges in Nigeria as a context is yet to attract as much academic 
discourse as those written for its technical and social science perspectives. Finally, the study 
may be limited to the search parameters used for material selection. The expansion of search 
keywords and databases in the future could yield additional materials, which can be more 
systematically analysed to further enrich this study.   
VALIDATION  
The validation of some of these findings is done using data from interviews conducted with 
five professionals who work in two different organisations in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.  
Table 5 represents the major findings from these interviews on why private organisations are 
finding it difficult to build refineries in Nigeria. The codes in Table 5 represents the roles and 
organisations of the interviewees. MNGR1 and 2 represents Manager 1 and 2 and ENG1, 2 3 
represents Engineers 1, 2 and 3 and ORG1 and 2 represents organisations 1 and 2 respectively. 
From the interviews, it can be observed that the first manager from the first organisation 
(MNGR1), raised issues such as regulated downstream market, corruption in the sector, and a 
lack of trust for sustainable government policies. This echoes the findings of many of the  
researchers including: Chikwem (2014/2016), Nkaginieme (2005) and Ogbuigwe (2018). 
Similarly, ENG1 echoes same sentients about lack of seriousness on the part of government, 
especially with the delay in the passage and implementation of the PIB, fixed pump price and 
challenges of foreign supplies of materials. This echoes the findings of, Nwachukwu (2015), 
Ogbuigwe (2018) and Wapner (2017). 
Also, ENG2 observes that refinery construction is a highly capital-intensive project with 
seemingly little returns. He also identifies more problems with insecurity and difficulties in 
raising funds, including weak government policies and inability to tame corruption. These 
observations reflect the views of Chikwem (2014/2016), Eti et al. (2003), Nwachukwu (2015).  
and. 
Furthermore, according to the second manager from the second organisation (MNGR2), 
building refineries in Nigeria is presently hardly economically attractive. With much reliance 
on foreign expertise and very little supporting infrastructure, the project becomes even costlier. 
In addition, there is usually some lengthy and difficult trouble to navigate around getting land 
and settling with communities. Also, the fixed pump price or regulated downstream market is 
hardly able to justify all the cost. This view reflects the submissions of Pederson and Kweka 
(2017), Nkaginieme (2005), Ogbuigwe (2018) and Osunmuyiwa & Kalfagianni (2017). 
Lastly, the ENG3 respondent observes that the current licensing schemes is not accompanied 
with strong vetting systems. There is hardly any government policy that looks into this. There 
is need for capital, a free unregulated downstream market and waivers for importing equipment 
to enable some companies to scale through some of the challenges. This is mostly in line with 
the observed loopholes in DPR’s licensing scheme (DPR, 2017; Eti et al., 2003). 
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Table 5: Findings from interviews 
ROLES ORGANISATION MAIN FINDINGS 
MNGR1 ORG1 The regulated downstream petroleum sector in the country makes investing 
in refineries uneconomical…. there are many other challenges the private 
sectors face in building refineries…the corruption in the system makes it very 
difficult to trust the government. If a company receives crude oil allocation 
from the government on certain terms, what is the guarantee that future 
administrations will continue to honour the terms of the agreement. Again, 
with the pump price of oil fixed, how can the companies make profit? Will 
the government also continue to pay us subsidies? Is it sustainable? 
ENG1 ORG1 I don’t think that the government is serious in pursuing that initiative. If they 
had passed the PIB since these years and made certain enforcements, most 
companies would have found a way….although raising the capital requires 
assurances that there will be a good return on that investment…you see, fixed 
pump price must be removed for the companies to thrive on a free 
market…the equipment and labour are mostly foreign and our poor exchange 
rates does not make matters any easier...certain partnerships may be required 
to achieve this more smoothly and the companies under such agreements must 
have something to complement each other. Under the right business 
environment, this can be done more easily but not so much here… 
ENG2 ORG1 It’s a very capital-intensive venture with potentially very little returns given 
the current environment. The insecurity in the country makes it even riskier 
and more costly. Raising billions of dollars for such projects may not interest 
most lenders for a country like Nigeria…government support will be 
paramount to realise that objective. There must be strong policies followed 
by actions…and government must be willing to tame corruption and allow a 
conducive environment…  
MNGR2 ORG2 Days are gone when refineries are considered to be economically very 
attractive. It is very capital intensive to embark on such projects. We rely a 
lot on foreign equipment and expertise for such complex facilities and it costs 
a lot of money. Even the infrastructure to support such investments is lacking 
and as such everything will need to be built from scratch. After going through 
the trouble of finding a suitable location for the project, the community must 
be settled. Sometimes it is a very lengthy process requiring meeting a lot of 
unreasonable demands. Putting all that issue aside, what rate of return can a 
company expect from a fixed pump price? The economics has to justify all 
the trouble… 
ENG3 ORG2 The reason why most companies appear to fail here is because government 
issues license to almost anybody that comes to them and say they want to 
build refineries without properly checking them out. If a company is willing 
to pay the initial capital for a license, they usually get it but unfortunately 
most of those companies lack the experience and wherewithal to complete 
such projects. If there is a strong criterion backed by policy, it will become a 
more serious business... Can’t you see how far Dangote has gone? If we have 
four to five more serious people like that, with government support, there can 
be serious progress with private refineries in Nigeria… Though a lot of 
challenges must be overcome. Capital, free market, supporting infrastructure 
and waivers for the import of equipment must all be thoughtfully 
considered… 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study was to investigate the difficulties of building refineries in Nigeria 
during the period of 1999 – 2019 as opposed to the ease of constructing same in the era of 1965 
– 1989. This is because despite numerous efforts to change the status of the sector through the 
construction of new refineries, the situation has remained unchanged. This study was 
conducted using a systematic literature review comparing drivers and enablers of the previous 
era with the situation of the present. Findings from selected sources were categorised and later 
validated with interviews with five professionals across two notable organisations. 
The current study contributes much to academic literature by helping to fill the gap in 
knowledge through the identification of some challenges with the construction of refineries in 
Nigeria since 1999 to present. The synthesis of findings from academic studies, consultancy 
and government papers in this study further enriches the academic knowledge on the subject. 
According to this study, there are nine main areas in which the current period of 1999 – 2019 
has witnessed remarkable challenges, which differ from those of 1965 - 1989. They include 
changes in factors such as project ownership, availability of capital and inconsistent 
government priorities. Others are issues with access to land for construction, cronyism and 
corruption, political will, refinery licensing scheme, security challenges and economic factors 
regarding regulated downstream market in Nigeria. Suggestions proffered are as summarised 
as below. 
It would be beneficial for the Nigerian government to investigate several models of partnering 
with the private sector using a suitable form of PPP/PFI to build and operate new refineries on 
their behalf. This model can also be used to refurbish and operate the existing refineries. For 
example, the model currently operated by the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG), 
whereby the stakeholders (government and the private IOCs) set up an independent private 
entity with the authority to run its operations with minimal interference, could be borrowed. 
This way, the government could (through partnership) leverage financing from the private 
sector, such as the IOCs, with expertise in such fields to build, refurbish and run a functional 
refining asset. The total deregulation of the downstream sector will be crucial for the realisation 
of this objective as the entity would thrive better in a free market environment. 
Also, a review of the existing licensing framework for refinery construction by the indigenous 
players is necessary to incorporate modalities that will ensure that only capable organisations 
are licensed and supported to achieve their objectives. This will imply the inclusion of strong 
vetting systems that will ensure only companies with reasonable experience and strong links 
with qualified foreign technical partners and financial integrity are licensed. 
The training and development of local skills and manpower will contribute towards lowering 
the cost of hiring personnel and material from foreign countries in building Nigeria’s refinery 
infrastructure. In addition, the establishment of more designated economic zones within the 
oil-producing Niger Delta where land can be allocated to the licensed companies at affordable 
rates will help lower the entry barriers for indigenous players. 
The impact of this study for refinery construction in Nigeria lies in understanding the 
implications of the identified challenges for organisations. As such, there is need for 
government’s cooperation with the private sector to overcome these challenges in order to 
realise the objectives. The Nigerian government can achieve this by adopting the 
recommendations of the findings of this study. This must also be backed by a clear commitment 
through policies that will support and encourage the local organisations.  
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In the future, further studies can be carried out on the Dangote Oil, Niger Delta Petroleum 
Resources and other private refineries, to investigate how these organisations managed to scale 
through some of these challenges, including their experience in building the current Nigeria’s 
refining infrastructure. 
Glossary  
Abbreviations Full Meanings 
BPD Barrels per day 
IOC International Oil Company 
KRPC Kaduna Refining and Petrochemical Company 
NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
PFI Public Finance Initiative 
PHRC Port Harcourt Refining Company 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
RPPs Refined Petroleum Products 
WRPC Warri Refining and Petrochemical Company 
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Table 3: Selected literature and main findings 
AUTHORS RESEARCH TITLE MAJOR FINDINGS /FACTORS 
RESEARCH 
METHOD 
PUBLICATION 
SOURCE 
Strassmann (1989) 
Rise, fall and the 
transformation of overseas 
construction contracting.  
There was a global construction boom in the 1970s and 1980s with 
developed countries exporting construction jobs and earning huge sums. 
This was later followed by less developed Countries (LDCs) like South 
Korea, India, Pakistan and recently China joining to make their fair 
share in the booming construction market. Nigeria and other African 
countries were recipients of this boom 
Content analysis Journal paper  
Andrews et al. 
(2015)  
Education and Training for 
the Oil and Gas Industry: 
The Evolution of Four 
Energy Nations: Mexico, 
Nigeria, Brazil, and Iraq. 
Oil windfall of the 1970s fuelled massive government investment on 
infrastructure in the oil and sector. In addition, the long political stasis 
by the national assembly in passing the PIB contributed to high levels of 
uncertainties in investment in the industry. Also, govt policy for the oil 
and gas sector has been unsustainable, unreliable and lacking in 
effectiveness. Too much focus given to the upstream sector and 
disregard for the development of the downstream sector 
Content analysis Journal paper 
Speight (2011) 
Chapter 10: Refinery of the 
future. The refinery of the 
future, William Andrew 
Publishing, Boston. 315-
340. 
Global refining technology is changing with the need for more complex 
plants able to process heavier and more diverse crude slate favouring 
more profits than the simpler plants. Current requirements to adhere to 
stricter environmental standards implies more expensive technology to 
meet current refining challenges. 
Quantitative 
analysis 
Journal Paper  
Ogbuigwe (2018)  
Refining in Nigeria: history, 
challenges and prospects.  
Attacks on pipelines and regulated petroleum product prices by govt. 
present challenges to investors. The continual management and 
maintenance of pipeline infrastructure raises project lifecycle cost.  
Content analysis  Journal paper  
Eti et al. (2004)  
Petrochemical industry in 
Nigeria: a performance 
appraisal. 
Construction of refinery assets in Nigeria is highly dependent on 
expatriate labour and know-how, as well as imported equipment. 
There is need for Nigeria to break away from traditional and outmoded 
indigenous and industrial procurement models and embrace changes that 
Content analysis Journal paper 
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will make development and maintenance of refinery infrastructure more 
viable and sustainable. 
Osunmuyiwa & 
Kalfagianni (2017)  
The Oil Climax: Can 
Nigeria’s fuel subsidy 
reforms propel energy 
transitions? Energy 
Research & Social 
Science, 27, 96-105. 
There is huge opportunity for investment in Nigeria’s refinery 
infrastructure given the high demand for energy, which is driven by 
population growth. Oil boom in the 1970s fuelled initial construction in 
the Nigerian refining sector. 
 
 Content analysis  Journal paper 
Pedersen & Kweka 
(2017) 
The political economy of 
petroleum investments and 
land acquisition standards in 
Africa: The case of 
Tanzania. Resources 
Policy, 52, 217-225. 
Land acquisition for oil and gas infrastructure development can be 
complex and difficult for private companies not only in Nigeria but 
across Africa. The private sector provides a more participatory route for 
land acquisition with the host communities whereas the government has 
a more forceful policy for taking up land with little or no participation 
from stakeholders. 
Case study Journal paper 
Turner (1977)  
Two refineries: A 
comparative study of 
technology transfer to the 
Nigerian refining 
industry. World 
Development, 5(3), 235-
256. 
Political will was very high in Nigerian government to own its own 
refinery asset as this was considered a major sign of development at the 
time. Also, the possibility of self-sufficiency for RPPs promised certain 
guarantees of security for oil at the time. In addition, the competition 
amongst oil majors to supply downstream technology such as refinery 
infrastructure to oil-rich countries was done partly in exchange for stable 
crude oil supplies. 
Case study Journal paper 
Chikwem (2016) 
The Political Economy of 
Fuel Importation Probes and 
Development of Refineries 
in Nigeria. 
The interplay of class interest and power relations aids and abets 
corruption amongst cabals benefiting from petroleum subsidies in 
Nigeria. This cabal is determined to frustrate Nigeria’s efforts to attain 
self-sufficiency for RPPs via the development of refining assets. The 
inability of Nigerian government to punish and deter the culprits inspires 
little investor confidence.  
Qualitative 
analysis 
Journal Paper 
Ako (2009) 
“Nigeria's Land Use Act: An 
Anti-Thesis to 
Environmental Justice”  
The promulgation of land use act by the Nigerian military government in 
1978 gave the government unrestricted access to vast amounts of land in 
Qualitative 
analysis 
Journal paper 
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the Niger delta for oil and gas projects without due compensations for 
the communities. 
Nkaginieme (2005) 
The challenges of building a 
new refinery in Nigeria with 
limited energy infrastructure 
& regulated petroleum 
products market 
Initial licenses awarded to private refineries could not yield fruit as the 
scope and large financial outlay required for the project precluded the 
awardees from breaking ground. Also, high entry barriers in terms of 
cost to build and purchase relevant equipment as well as high exit 
barriers for potential liabilities all contributed to further complicate the 
task. 
In addition, the perception from foreign counterparts that many African 
countries carry additional risk involving currency fluctuations, local 
content requirements, corruption, political, civil and economic instability 
contributed to difficulties in fostering partnership with local players. 
An overview paper Conference paper  
Gary et al. (2007) 
Petroleum refining 
technology and economics 
Economies of scale tend to favour the expansion of existing refinery 
infrastructure to the construction of new ones. Also, shrinking global 
margins for refineries currently make it more difficult and economically 
unviable to build new refineries.  
 Published book 
Atumah (2016) 
 
Nigeria’s Oil Refineries in 
Oblivion 
There is enough incentive for investment in building Nigeria’s refining 
infrastructure, including the potential for exports. Growth in energy 
demand was a major driver for refinery construction in Nigeria between 
1975 and 1989. The market value for the construction of the last three 
refining assets was nearly 2 billion dollars and this was mostly filled by 
expatriate labour.  
Interview report National daily 
Nwachukwu (2015) 
 
Buhari approves 65 licences 
for private refineries 
The challenges of refinery construction in Nigeria are tied to political, 
land, funding, crude feedstock and market availability. The difficulties 
of securing capital from banks due to high collateral or guarantees also 
constitute additional barriers. 
Interview with a 
refinery expert 
National daily 
Boyo (2015) Fuel imports: the real cabal 
There is a cabal of Nigerian importers determined to frustrate efforts to 
salvage Nigerian refineries in order to continue reaping from the 
petroleum subsidy funds to the detriment of the national economy. 
Qualitative  National Daily 
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PwC (2017)  Nigerian refining revolution 
Refineries are highly capital intensive; with the conventional ones 
running into billions of dollars for construction and the modular types 
into tens of millions of dollars. Nigerian investors may not have the 
financial muscle to invest in the more profitable conventional types but 
may do better with the modular ones. However, due to economies of 
scale, the conventional types are more profitable than the modular types 
except for the diesel units which may have a more limited market size. 
A country analysis Consultancy report 
Wapner (2017) 
Key Points Downstream 
Beneficiation Case Study: 
Nigeria 
There is enough incentive to invest and build Nigeria’s refining 
infrastructure. The growing demand for RPPs which is fed by imports 
from foreign countries and the local availability of crude oil to supply 
the refineries provide evidence to this fact. However, govt policies 
towards the realization of this objective has been incoherent and 
ineffective. 
Qualitative  Policy paper 
DPR (2017) 
Guidelines for the 
establishment of 
hydrocarbon processing 
plants in Nigeria 
Three tiers of licensing scheme are presented. There are certain 
bureaucracies associated with the guidelines and requirements to 
navigate these steps, which raise the barriers of entry for some 
organisations. 
Government 
guidelines 
Government paper 
Angela et al.(2019) 
Challenges and prospects of 
converting Nigeria illegal 
refineries to modular 
refineries 
Some companies which expressed interest in refinery construction 
encountered difficulties at various stages of the projects. Common 
reasons cited by many include insufficient funds for capital project, 
political issues, government price regularization on products, un-
conducive environment, power and security challenges and the 
unwillingness of the Federal Government to support local investors   
Expert views Journal Paper 
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Table 4: Summary of differences for key drivers in refinery construction for the 1965 - 1989 versus 1999 - 2019 
FACTORS 1965 - 1989 1999 - 2019 KEY REFERENCES  
Project 
Ownership 
Government was project owners/partners or 
sponsors of the refinery construction projects 
in this period. 
Since after Nigeria’s transition to democracy, the focus of 
ownership of new refinery assets now rests with the private sector, 
which face different challenges from those experienced by the 
government in the previous era. 
Turner, 1977; Ogbuigwe, 2018; 
Nkaginieme, 2005; Olufolahan et 
al., 2017 and Nwachukwu, 2015 
Availability of 
capital and 
inconsistent 
government 
priorities. 
 
The massive injection of petrodollar arising 
from the oil windfall of the 1970s coupled 
with the construction boom in the oil sector at 
the time, fuelled developments of built assets 
and facilities in the industry.  
Although the current period has equally enjoyed some fluctuated 
price increases from oil (2007 – 2014), government attention has, 
however, focused less on oil infrastructure developments compared 
to public capital projects. Also, the prolonged delay with the 
passage of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) as well as 
uncertainties about its implementation may have deterred investors 
from such undertaking. 
(Ogbuigwe, 2018; Pedersen, Kweka 
2017a, Nkaginieme, 2005 and 
Nwachukwu, 2015; Strassmann, 
1989; Speight 2010, Gary et al., 
2007 and Osunmuyiwa & 
Kalfagianni, 2017)  
Access to land 
for 
construction  
The introduction of land use act (1978) under 
the military government paved the way for 
easier access to land by the state than it is for 
the private sector, which bear this as 
additional burden. 
The process of land acquisition for the private sector is more 
participatory with stakeholders who must be compensated than it 
was for the government in the previous era. Also, low investor 
confidence and perception of Nigeria as a high-risk nation by most 
lending institutions make access to loan capital more difficult for 
local players. 
Ako 2009; Nwachukwu, 2015) 
Cronyism and 
corruption 
This was hardly a hindrance for infrastructure 
developments in the oil sector at the time. 
Highly connected import cartel who benefit from subsidy payments 
frustrate govt. policies towards refinery establishment.  
Chikwem, 2014 and Chikwem, 
2016; Ogbuigwe, 2018; 
Nkaginieme, 2005 and Boyo, 2015 
Political will 
Political will in government circles was quite 
high in this era as the ownership of such 
assets as refineries were considered major 
signs of development. 
Moderate to low political will. Government communicates 
willingness to get the sector working but does little to turn around 
the situation. This is partly connected to corruption fuelled by 
personal gains for politicians and their cronies. 
Chikwem, 2016, Nwachukwu, 
2015, Ogbuigwe, 2018; Wapner, 
2017 and Eti et al, 2003 
Licensing 
scheme 
The Federal Government drafted the 
Petroleum Act of 1969, which governed the 
establishment of hydrocarbon processing 
Current licensing scheme by the DPR designed for the public sector 
has been ineffectual and considered by private investors to contain 
requirements presenting high entry/exit barriers. 
Nkaginieme (2005); Nwachukwu, 
2015 
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plants. As such, it was much easier for the 
government to operate by their own 
agreement.  
Security 
Issues 
There were hardly any incidents for pipeline 
attacks on refinery infrastructure during this 
period. Therefore, most of the RPPs were 
reliably distributed from local refineries 
making such arrangements much cheaper than 
paying high premiums on subsidies. 
Attacks on pipelines due to persistent militancy make Nigeria a 
potentially high-risk environment for such project development. 
This has sometimes helped to justify market conditions for product 
imports as a cheaper alternative for fuel supply in Nigeria. 
Ogbuigwe, 2018; Wapner, 2017, 
Pwc, 2017 
Economic 
factors and 
economy of 
scale 
The last three refineries built by the federal 
government were all conventional refineries, 
which economies of scale tend to favour. 
Economies of scale suggest that the construction of the more 
expensive large-scale conventional refineries is more viable than 
the smaller plants.  
(Gary et al., 2007; Chikwem 2014, 
Akanle, et al. 2014, Wapner, 2017 
and Nkaginieme, 2005)  
Regulated 
downstream 
market 
With government as project owners, the sale 
of RPPs at fixed prices means that govt would 
have to pay for the shortfall via subsidy funds. 
The private sector cannot fare well in a regulated market 
environment and must be allowed to sell at prevailing market 
conditions to recoup their project costs in a reasonable timeframe. 
Ogbuigwe, 2018  
 
